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BORDERLANDS, CONFLICT, AND IDENTITY IN
CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

STEVEN M. HOFFMAN* AND RENEE BUHR**

Abstract
Ukraine has long been a site of European instability, an historically
stateless nation at the periphery of empires. While the current conflict is no
doubt linked to the "realpolitik" of NATO expansion, as well as the
domestic politics of Russia's near abroad, Ukraine's larger history is also
in play. In particular, the issue of 'national identity' and the difficulty of
securing firm foundations for the nationalist project continue to pose
significant difficulties for the region. This national legacy mixes with a
divided economy to make differences between east and west more salient
than they may otherwise be. This paper locates current issues, including the
creation and expansion of the so-called Eurasian Economic Union (EEC),
within this centuries-oldproblem.
INTRODUCTION

On September 16, 2014, the Ukrainian government passed a law giving
self-rule to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and granting amnesty to
Russian separatist fighters in the regions, a concession viewed as a victory
for the pro-Russian forces in the east. The same government then signed
and ratified an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU),
achieving a long-time goal of successive Ukrainian presidents and
committing Ukraine to a future tied to Europe and specifically the European
Union and its way of conducting business.' An observer could be forgiven
for viewing these near-simultaneous developments with confusion. After
all, how can Ukraine pull in apparently opposite directions, both eastward
toward Russia and westward toward the European Union, at the same time?
This article addresses a number of explanations for this behavior. In short,
Ukraine, even more so than some of its East European neighbors, is a

* Professor and Chair Department of Political Science, University of St. Thomas.
** Associate Professor Department of Political Science, University of St. Thomas.

1. See Ukraine Crisis: Rebels Granted Self-Rule and Amnesty, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Sept.
16, 2014), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29220885.
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borderland caught between great powers, a territory dominated by large
kingdoms and empires from the end of Kievan Rus' (900s AD) until the end
of the Soviet era (1991). The push and pull of great powers remains a major
factor in incentivizing and delimiting Ukraine's behavior as an independent
state in the post-Soviet era; while land empires may be a thing of the past,
Ukraine remains bordered by competing powers, Russia to the east and the
European Union to the west. The effects of this borderland condition on
Ukrainian political behavior can be viewed through a variety of lenses:
power politics or realpolitik, national identity and its connection with
memory and the interpretation of history, and economics, each of which
will be featured in this article.
From the outset, it is important to remember that the "eastward" turn
toward Russia taken by President Yanukovych in 2013 was a significant
departure from the rhetoric and actions of prior Ukrainian presidents. In the

post-Soviet era, Ukraine was hailed by the EU for its "European choice"
and its decision to engage with the European Union. Indeed, the first former
Soviet state with which the EU openly engaged was Ukraine, which also
served as a conduit for EU diplomacy for its more eastward-orientated
neighbors such as Belarus.2 Ukrainian presidents also committed

themselves rhetorically to cooperation with the EU. While early presidents
such as the non-reformer Kravchuk and the economic reformer Kuchma

committed to a multi-vectoral foreign policy that included positive relations
with Russia, this was not considered incompatible with deepening trade ties
with the EU, nor with pursuing some sort of economic integration with it.
Kuchma's rhetoric was backed up with some domestic institution building
and a 'road map' meant to facilitate Ukraine's integration into the EU.3 The

-

key documents managing the relationship between Ukraine and the EU
the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the more
extensive 2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its Action Plan
for Ukraine - were negotiated and signed under Kuchma's leadership. In
the 2004 elections and subsequent Orange Revolution, Kuchma appears as a

supporter of Yanukovych in opposition to the openly pro-western
Yushchenko, but this should not be interpreted as an anti-EU position on
Kuchma's part.

After the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko took a hard turn
westward and largely abandoned the Russian aspect of the multi-vectoral

policy approach of his predecessor, though the extent to which this could be
successfully done was limited by Ukraine's continued reliance on Russia

2. Fredo Arias-King, The Genesis of the European Union's Relations with Ukraine and
Belarus: Interview with Luis Moreno, 14 J. POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 4 (2006).
3. Kataryna Wolczuk, Implementation Without Coordination: The Impact of EU
Conditionality on Ukraine Under the European Neighborhood Policy, 16 EURO-ASIA STUDIES
187 (2009).
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for energy, and markets for Ukrainian exports. Yushchenko stated that his
goal was to enter into talks for Ukrainian accession to the EU within three
years, which he expected as a reward for the turn toward 'European
parliamentarism' demonstrated by the Orange Revolution and the strongly
pro-EU regime elected in its wake. 4 Even with the election of Yanukovych
in 2010, the EU vector of the multi-vectoral foreign policy held, with
Yanukovych's first diplomatic visit being to Brussels to meet with the EU
and reassure the institution of Ukraine's continued intention to achieve
deeper integration with its western neighbors. Yanukovych's administration
participated in the Vilnius Summit, where the negotiation of the Association
Agreement took place. Yanukovych walked away from these talks, but the
resulting agreement was recently signed by the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
and now-President Petro Poroshenko.
Given such apparently deep commitments to Europe, Yanukovych's
decision of November 2013 to discontinue negotiations on the Association
Agreement, and accept an aid package from Russia, came as a shock to the
EU and Ukrainians alike.6 The Euromaidanprotests, which began as rallies
in support of the Association Agreement, turned to protests against the
President's apparent decision to turn away from Europe. After years of
pursuit of the goal of deeper integration with the EU and rhetoric from
successive presidents indicating that the multi-vectoral policy including the
EU was the key to Ukraine's future, a unilateral turn toward Russia was
shocking. This, combined with increased concerns about Yanukovych's
centralization of power, the selective use of the judiciary against political
opponents, and ever-deepening official corruption, provided much of the
fuel for the protests throughout Ukraine that led to Yanukovych's flight to
Russia in February 2014.
The multi-vectoral foreign policy favored by both Ukrainian leaders
and the Ukrainian public (revealed in polls discussed later in this article) is
different from that adopted by some of Ukraine's neighbors, particularly the
Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia who have fully turned toward
Europe and away from cooperation with Russia. The reasons for this
difference in approach lie in the three lines of explanation addressed here:
power politics and more specifically geopolitics, the contested nature of
Ukrainian national identity, and the economic realities of Soviet and postSoviet Ukraine.

4.

Jeffrey Pridham, Ukraine, the European Union and the Democracy Question, 11

ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 18 (2011).

5. Emmnuelle Armandon, PopularAssessments of Ukraine's Relations with Russia and the
European Union under Yanukovych, 21 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 289 (2013).
6. Nadia Diuk, Euromaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution, WORLD AFFAIRS
(Mar. 2014), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine's-self-organizingrevolution.

74

UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. IX

I. POWER AND POLITICS AND THE UKRAINE: THE BORDERLAND BETWEEN
GREAT POWERS
Scholars in the domain of realist international relations would attribute
many of the complications seen in Ukraine today to a case of unfavorable

geopolitics, while a historian may be more likely to refer to Ukraine as a
borderland or "shatterzone." In either case, scholars pursuing this line of

explanation would likely agree on Marcu's description of geopolitics in
post-Communist Europe:

We have been witnessing in Europe two phenomena that dominate
the geopolitical scene: on the one hand there is integration, with the
advance of the borders of the European Union (EU) towards the
east through its two enlargements, and on the other hand there is
disintegration, as expressed by social crisis, and latent tensions and

conflicts in the countries found beyond the said border.
According to this line of thought, the political divisions seen between
the west and east portions of Ukraine (particularly evident during the 2004
presidential elections) and the recent violence in the east, led by proRussian separatists, are the result of centuries of tensions engendered by

Ukraine's borderland status. The borderlands of the great land empires, the
Hapsburg, Prussian, Russian, and Ottoman, were by definition
multicultural. According to Bartov and Weitz, violence in the borderlands
was often the result of great power rivalries, as great powers used ideology,
race, and new technologies as a means to expand their territorial boundaries

within the borderlands.' While it would be an overstatement to say that the
cultural groups lived in a permanent state of peaceful coexistence, after all
violence could break out amongst the groups without great power urging,

the role of great powers in inciting such violence should be kept in mind,
particularly in light of the current conflict in Ukraine and the role that proRussian sentiment is playing in the separatist movement in Luhansk and

Donetsk, and indeed in the support for the annexation of Crimea by Russian
troops in March 2014.
Geopolitics here serves as a more specific means of understanding a

realist interpretation of the conditions in Ukraine. Mearsheimer's "offensive
realism" focuses on the role of great powers in setting the stage of
international relations fits neatly into this line of argumentation.9 For

7.

Silvia Marcu, The Geopolitics of the Eastern Border of the European Union: The Case

of Romania - Moldova - Ukraine, 14 GEOPOLITICS 409 (2009).
8. See OMER BARTOV ET AL., SHATTERZONE OF EMPIRES: COEXISTENCE AND VIOLENCE
IN THE GERMAN, HAPSBURG, RUSSIAN AND OTTOMAN BORDERLANDS (2013).
9.
See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2011).
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instance, Mearsheimer recently argued that much of the blame for the
current level of instability can be traced to the West's naive belief that
"Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as
the rule of law, economic interests, and democracy." 0 The consequences of
such simplistic thinking is compounded by failing to see that previous
efforts "to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia's border" was
"a direct threat to Moscow" and Russian interests." Putin's recent speech
celebrating the annexation of Crimea directly referenced this threat. In the
first place, argued the President, Crimea had been arbitrarily and
unconstitutionally "gifted" to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in
1954 by then President Nikita Khrushchev and thus could not be considered
to be part of Ukraine proper; its return to Russia was simply a correction of
a mistake that had not been dealt with at the time of the USSR's collapse.1 2
Further, had Russia not recovered Crimea, and if Ukraine had been
admitted into NATO - a move that would have, according to the Kremlin,
violated key promises made by the West at the time of the Soviet collapse,1 3
"NATO's navy would be right there in this city of Russia's military glory,
and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole
of southern Russia."14
From the realpolitik perspective, far from wanting to re-establish the
Russian empire or the USSR, the issue is simply a matter of recognizing the
legitimate interests of a country that, even given its currently weakened
condition, remains at least a regional power. Again, Putin was clear on this
point, arguing that "Russia is an independent, active participant in
international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests
that need to be taken into account and respected." 5 Such concerns are only
exacerbated by recent announcements that NATO is intending to establish
forward 'receiving' bases in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe in
order to be prepared should Russia continue its aggressions in other postSoviet states, particularly in the Baltics, a move conditioned upon Article 5
provisions that understand an attack on one member of NATO as an attack

10. John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 77,
78 (2014).
11. Id.at78-79.
12. At the time, of course, the dissolution of the USSR and the loss of the Black Sea port of
Sevastopol to the Russian, as opposed to the USSR, navy, was not contemplated.
13. Mary Elise Sarotte, A Broken Promise: What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO
Expansion, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 90 (2014).
14.
News Desk, Full Text of Putin's Speech on Crimea, PRAGUE POST (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://praguepost.com/eu-news/37854-full-text-of-putin-s-speech-on-crimea#ixzz3BhfUlStj;
Putin
moderated his tone just a bit when he added, "I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to
Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be
better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round."

15.

Id.
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on all members of the alliance.1 6
Geopolitics can also be used as a lens through which to view the
Ukraine/EU relationship. Marcu discusses the effects of the EU expansion
of its borders into East Europe, indicating the borders between members of
the EU (including post-Communist accession states admitted in 2004 and

2007) today serve as "bridges" rather than "barriers." This is not the
situation faced by those who have not been admitted, such as Ukraine.
Rather, to those non-members, borders are "a barrier, a violent process of

exclusion, expressed by the reinforcement of border security."1 7 Despite
Ukraine's persistent striving toward integration with the EU throughout the

post-Soviet era, Ukraine has never been quite "enough" to qualify for
inclusion in the EU club. Ukraine's politics were never quite democratic
enough, its economy and political actors not incorruptible enough, and its

economic development not liberal enough. According to many scholars, EU
officials viewed the democratic transition, the fight against corruption, and

economic liberalization as "Ukraine's problems." Only when Ukraine made
major domestic improvements would real membership become an option.
Until then, Ukraine would be treated as an outsider, along with other postSoviet states such as Belarus and Moldova, both of which have shown far

less commitment to engaging the EU. To some extent Ukraine's slow
progress on addressing these precursor conditions was a result of the lack of
EU efforts to assist, as the carrots and sticks provided by the EU were

insufficient to incentivize real political and economic change in Ukraine."
There is, therefore, no doubt that arguments about strategic interests,
NATO enlargement, territorial annexations, and other such issues are
critical in understanding and assessing the potential actions of international

actors. However, for all of its utility, the practitioners of realpolitik and
geopolitics often underestimate the extent to which even the most pragmatic
of actions are sustained and informed by normative, cultural, and social-

psychological concerns which often go unacknowledged in judging and
interpreting the actions of a state actor. In this case, behind the tensions

currently roiling the borderlands of Russia and Ukraine lies an issue of truly
historic proportion, namely, the role and consequences of both individual
and national identity.

16.

Ian Traynor, Ukraine crisis: NATO plans east European bases to counter Russia, THE

GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/nato-east-european-

bases-counter-russian-threat.
17. Marcu, supra note 7, at 420.
18. See Paul Kubicek, The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine, 38
COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 269 (2005); Kataryna Wolczuk, Implementation
Without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine Under the European
Neighborhood Policy, 16 EURO-ASIA STUDIES 187 (2009); Armandon, supra note 5, at 289.
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II. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE RUSSIAN HOMELAND

In his speech memorializing Crimea's decision to return home to
Russia, Mr. Putin declared that:
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This
is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was
baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined
the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that
unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of
Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian
empire are also in Crimea .... It was only when Crimea ended up
as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not
simply robbed, it was plundered.19
The "robbery" is, of course, part of a larger story, one that culminated
in 1991 when, according to Putin, "[M]illions of people went to bed in one
country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities
in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the
biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by
borders."20
By this telling, the patrimony of all 'true Russians' begins with the rise
of Kieven Rus' and Novgorod and the ascendency of Muscovy. It continues
with the titanic struggle to remove the smothering grip of the Mongols and
the emergence of the Tsars, including Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and
Catherine the Great, the centuries-long rule of the Romonovs and the much
shorter-lived USSR. Given such a history, it is no wonder that the answer to
the question of who is Russian and the meaning and impact of acquiring
and accepting that identity is shrouded in ambiguity, claims, and
counterclaims.
For Putin, a significant element of one's identity centers around
language. Despite the contested nature of such a claim,21 Putin is insistent,
returning again and again to the idea that language, more than any other
primordial asset, defines who one is. According to Putin, for instance, the
350,000 Crimean Ukrainians who consider themselves to be ethnic
Russians do so primarily because Russian is their "native" language. A
violation of language rights, in any form, is therefore a violation of a
person's right to express his or her essential humanity, in this case, the

19.

News Desk, supra note 14.

20.
21.

Id.
See Renee Buhr et al., Language as a Determinant of National Identity: The Unusual

Case of Belarus, Language in Different Contexts. 4 LITHUANIAN U. EDU. SCIENCES, FACULTY OF

PHILOLOGY 60 (2011).
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freedom to act and be a "real Russian."
For Putin, the usurpation of this right to "be Russian" is evident in the
new Ukraine. Thus, while hoping:
[T]hat Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially
its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and
civilized state that would protect their rights in line with the norms
of international law . . . this is not how the situation developed.

Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of
their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them
to forced assimilation.22
In Putin's telling, the Ukrainian "nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes
and anti-Semites" who executed the "coup" following the Maidan protests,
began their reign "by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy,
which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities."23 As a
result, while avowedly respecting the sovereignty of Ukraine as an
"undivided country," Putin is compelled to act upon a greater reality,
namely that Russians and Ukrainians are:
[O]ne people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus' is
our common source and we cannot live without each other ....
Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine
and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests
using political, diplomatic and legal means.24
Russia's actions in support of those "real Russians" in both Crimea and
the east of Ukraine are often judged to be popular amongst the domestic
Russians. While there are very good reasons to question the claims of
overwhelming levels of public support for the regime's actions, there is no
doubt that an influential clique of strong Russian nationalists are pushing
Putin to return Ukraine to its historic Russian home.25 Such pressures are
complimented by an alternative nationalist narrative which, while different
in theme, continues the historic struggle to determine just exactly who is

22. News Desk, supra note 14.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Yekaterina Shulman, Russia's Mock Democracy Feeds Off Apathy, Moscow TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2014) http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-s-mock-democracyfeeds-off-apathy/505819.html (Russia is a prime example of a so-called 'mock' or 'hybrid'
democracy. According to Shulman, a key aspect of such a regime is the ability to produce public
opinion polls of dubious legitimacy, due mainly to the apathy that conditions the social relations
between the masses of the people and the regime).
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what.
Generally referred to as Eurasianismor Neo-Eurasianism,this effort is
strongly linked to "the search by Russian political elites to find a new
framework of identity for the broader Russian."2 6 While the annexation of
Crimea and the aggressive destabilizing moves in Eastern Ukraine satisfies
the realpolitik goals of border protection and regional hegemony,
Eurasianism is informed by a larger search for identity that seeks to bind
together Turkic-speaking peoples-or Turanians-of the Central Asian
steppe. According to Lukin:
The ideological roots of the notion of a greater Eurasia first arose
among Russian philosophers and historians who emigrated from
communist Russia to western Europe in the 1920s. But they gazed
in a different direction: whereas earlier Slavophiles emphasized
Slavic unity and contrasted European individualism with the
collectivism of Russian peasant communities, the Eurasianists
linked the Russian people to the Turkic-speaking peoples-or
'Turanians'- of the Central Asian steppe.27
According to the early Eurasianists, the Turanian civilization, which
supposedly originated in ancient Persia, followed its own political and
economic model, which at least according to Lukin, was essentially
authoritarian. 28 The Eurasianists also placed great emphasis on traditional
Turanian social structures, most importantly the region's churches, which in
Russia's case largely means Eastern Orthodoxy. Seen in this light, Putin's
elevation of Orthodoxy and his tendency to use the trappings of the church
to bolster the legitimacy of his actions, i.e., the blessing of this summer's
Ukraine-bound humanitarian aid convoy by an Orthodox priest, is easily
located within a complex of more immediate and pragmatic actions,
including the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community. The
idea that Ukraine would reject the EEC in favor of deeper ties with the
West is therefore both an ideological affront to the Eurasianists that
apparently form an important part of the Kremlin's decision making
apparatus, as well as a blow to the pragmatists, Putin included, who place
great stock in the community's ability to serve as an economic
counterweight to the European Union.

26.
Paul Pryce, Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?,11 ROMANIAN J. EUR.
AFF. 18, 29 (2013); see also Edith Clowes, RUSSIA ON THE EDGE: IMAGINED GEOGRAPHIES AND
POST-SOVIET IDENTITY (2011).
27. Alexander Lukin, What the Kremlin is Thinking, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 85, 91-2 (2014).

28.

Id.
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III. IDENTITY AND UKRAINE

A little over one hundred years ago, the war to end all wars erupted,
occasioned by a series of epic blunders, strategic miscalculations, dated
tactics, and imperial hubris.2 9 Among other numberless consequences, the
war unleashed the full power of nationalism and the struggles to define
personal identity within the context of a larger, collective self. One story
that tells us a good deal about this struggle and its continuing reverberations
in the 21st century is that of the Sich Rifle Association and their sacrifices at
Mount Makivka (April 29 - May 3, 1915). Andrew Higgins describes the
battle this way:
A muddled and modest affair on a pine-covered mountain in what
is today western Ukraine 'only' a few hundred soldiers died. For
Ukrainian nationalists, however, the battle nearly a century ago was
a singular event not only in World War I, but also in a longer
conflict with Russia that rumbles on today at the eastern end of
their country. For [according to these same Ukrainian nationalists]
it was at Makivka ...
[that] they held their ground against the
Russian Empire ... Makivka ... showed we could fight.30
But who, exactly, is the "we" to whom they are referring? The soldiers
who fought at Makivka were doing so under the banner of the AustrianHungarian Empire, a spent force on the cusp of dismemberment by the
soon-to-be-victorious Allied Powers. Organized in a western territory
known as Galicia in August 1914 at the initiative of the Supreme Ukrainian
Council, the first volunteers were members of Ukrainian paramilitary
organizations, such as the Sich societies, Sokil, and Plast Ukrainian Youth
Association.31 Subsequent to its actions at Makivka, the legion sustained
significant casualties in a number of battles. Following successive
reorganizations, the Rifleman, known in a Ukrainian transliteration as the
Ukrainski sichovi striltsi (USS) arrived in Lviv on November 3, 1918 and
participated in an unsuccessful effort to prevent the city from being

29.
MAX HASTINGS, CATASTROPHE 1914: EUROPE GOES TO WAR (2013).
30.
Andrew Higgins, A Battle in Ukraine Echoes Through the Decades, NYTIMES.COM
(Jun. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/europe/world-war-i-battle-in-ukraineechoes-through-the-decades.html
31.
Sich Societies were formal associations that began as a mass physical-education and firefighting organization. Societies were active in Galicia from 1900 to 1930 and then spread to
Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, and Ukrainian communities abroad. Beyond its immediate practical
purpose, it strove to promote national consciousness and to raise the educational and cultural level
of the peasantry and working class. Organized by leading members of the Ukrainian Radical
party, its ideology was secular and somewhat anticlerical. See the Internet Encyclopedia of
Ukraine for additional details on the society, including significant materials on the activities and
writers associated with these organizations and the Ukrainian nationalist cause.
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captured by the Poles. By January 1919 the battalion was expanded into the
First Brigade of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and later that year
into the Red Ukrainian Galician Army, all the while trying to advance the
cause of Ukrainian nationalism in the face of an advancing Polish army.
Unsuccessful, they capitulated to the Poles on May 2, 1920.32
The 800 or so members of the USS hold an enormously outsized
position in the Ukrainian national consciousness. Indeed, while an
additional 250,000 Ukrainians served the Austrians as conscripts, some 3.5
million others, a vast majority of them also conscripts, fought for the
Russians. To a great extent, these numbers and the various sides with which
Ukrainians fought reflected the imperial makeup of pre-World War Europe.
In the west, an area which included Galicia, the Austrian Empire was
content with a fairly loose, if not exactly benign, system of oversight that
allowed the nationalist sentiments ascendant in the latter half of the 19 th
century to gain a strong foothold in the region. The east, on the other hand,
was under the control of a very centralized and illiberal Russian empire
intent on ensuring that no independent sense of "Ukrainianism" ever took
root.
Providing a context for the USS were the larger forces of the war.
Russia had seized Lviv in September 1914 and began hunting down those
accused of being traitors and spies, often Ukrainians who had embraced
what one tsarist official described as "extremely dangerous Little Russian
separatism."33 The region's new Russian governor shut down Ukrainianlanguage schools that had been nurtured by the Austrians, arrested the head
of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and started an aggressive campaign to
destroy the idea that Ukrainian interests could ever legitimately diverge
from those of Russia. Austrian forces later recaptured Lviv, which they
called Lemberg, in 1915. With help from Germany, they moved deep into
what had been Russian-ruled Ukrainian territories, including Kiev.34
All of this produced a series of competing states: one in Kiev formed
from what had been Russian-controlled territory in central and eastern
Ukraine, another based in Lviv on western Ukrainian lands that had been
ruled until World War I by the Hapsburgs, and a third created by the
Bolsheviks, who seized power in Russia in 1917, centered in the nominally
Ukrainian state in the eastern city of Kharkiv, the principal purpose of
which was to thwart the Ukrainian efforts to take advantage of the chaos
created by the war and run their own affairs. These were short-lived
experiments and whatever hopes for an independent state existed in the
32. Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKRAINE (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\U\K\UkrainianSichRiflem
en.htm.
33. Higgins, supra note 30.
34. Id.
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minds of Ukrainian nationalists were dashed by the Allies when they agreed
in 1919 that Poland should take over former Hapsburg territory around
Lviv. Russia kept the east and ultimately formed the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. Nonetheless, in the eyes of many Ukrainian nationalists,
this brief period of autonomy, even if it did not result in the ability to
exercise the powers associated with an independent state, was crucial for

the development of the idea of a sovereign Ukraine.
Seizing upon the political and social space afforded by the instability of
the period, at least some Ukrainian nationalists worked assiduously to

create a national sensibility. For instance, "[W]hen Mykola Khvyl'ovy
formed his organization VAPLITE and initiated the Great Literary
Discussion of 1925-27, his aim was to accelerate the Ukrainianization
process . . . [and] to promote a new Ukrainian identity."3 5 According to

Shkandrij, Khvyl'ovy showed evidence of a "nation-building imperative",
using "historical allusions and narratives that could serve as allegories of
the nation's fate."3 6 Others writers, such as Lev Kopelev, Benediklt

Livshits, and Yurii Smolych, while sometimes referencing the Eurasian
renaissance,

nonetheless

focused

their work "not

on

some

abstract,

borderless, geographical [postmodern] space, but on Ukraine."3 7 The
narratives employed by these writers employed a common trope: a
frustrated individual, blocked by the crushing realities of revolution and
war, serves as a surrogate "for a nation that is not allowed to express itself,
whose dream of cultural development has been dashed."3 8 In sum:

Both artists and writers sought to identify key elements out of
which culture had been formed . . . [searching] for elements of the
cultural code that represented the national experience and identity

as it had evolved over the centuries. They examined archetypal
forms, characters, canonical images and works, and then recoded
these into a new format and new identity . . . The search for the
'grammatical structure' for national identity became analogous to
experimentation with pure color and form in painting, or with the
search for basic patterns of sound and meaning in poetry.3 9

The post-war actions of the Allies and the newly created USSR
ultimately did little to bring these dreams to fruition. Instead, the interwar
years saw a Poland threatened by the USSR from the east, a rising Germany

35. MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ, NATIONAL MODERNISM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY:
THE UKRAINIAN RENAISSANCE AND JEWISH REVIVAL, 1917-1930,438 (2013).
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id., at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id., at 440.
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from the west and a large domestic population in Galicia and Volhynia who
understood themselves as Ukrainians unfairly tethered to the Polish state.
Compounding the difficulties in the Ukrainian SSR was a Soviet
nationalities policy that ranged from highly supportive to absolutely
destructive of the nationalist aspirations of the many ethnic communities
found in the USSR.4 0 According to Francine Hirsch, Soviet state-sponsored
nationalism was initially "premised on the belief that 'primordial' ethnic
groups were the building blocks of nationalities and on the assumption that
the state could intervene in the natural process of development and
'construct' modern nations."41 Early Soviet indoctrination required 'double
assimilation', namely, the simultaneous assimilation of individuals into
both a national identity, which in some cases coincided with ethnic
sensibilities, and a Soviet identity.4 2 This made for a Soviet nationalities
policy that had a split personality from its very origins and later seems to
have led to the varying trajectories that post-Soviet identities have taken.
Thus, in the early years of Bolshevik rule Moscow actively promoted the
trappings of nationhood throughout the Soviet Union through the policy of
korenizatsiia (nativization). This included efforts to educate students in
their "own" languages (say, Ukrainian for those of Ukrainian ancestry),
establishment of a literary version of the local languages where needed, and
cultural exhibits exalting the arts, crafts, and acceptable heroes of the nation
in question. Intellectual activity was aimed at developing the national
identity to its fullest, and Moscow instituted policies calling for the
promotion of a national Communist elite.4 3 With the rise of Stalin's power
and the subsequent Great Retreat of the 1930s, much of this was scaled
back, oftentimes in brutal fashion.
Soviet nationalities policies produced a seriously mixed set of signals.
Thus, individuals with the right national identity had opportunities in the
government as a result of their nationality, national languages were still
taught, and national culture that was consistent with Soviet ideology was
promoted. But at the same time that nationalism was being promoted, the
notion of a shared Soviet - universal and proletarian - identity was also
being fashioned. That identity was based, if not in theory then in practice,
on Russian language and culture. Thus, the right national identity and the

40.
AVIEL ROSHWALD, ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND THE FALL OF EMPIRES: CENTRAL
EUROPE, RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-1923 179 (2001);The following paragraphs are
drawn from Buhr, Shadurski, and Hoffman (2011) where the Soviet nationalities policy is more
fully explored and discussed in the context of Belarusian nationalism.
41.
FRANCINE HIRSCH, EMPIRE OF NATIONS: ETHNOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE
MAKING OF THE SOVIET UNION 8 (2005)
42. Id.; DMITRY GORENBURG, SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AND ASSIMILATION (2006).
43. RONALD SUNY, THE REVENGE OF THE PAST: NATIONALISM, REVOLUTION, AND THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (1993); Yuri Slezkine, The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or

How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,53 SLAVIC REV. 414, 414-452 (1994).
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ability to speak the national tongue were key elements to gaining elite status
in the non-Russian republics, but so was an understanding of Russian

language and culture. As the years wore on, the Soviet identity of the
republics increased as their elites, and the "average citizen" became more
immersed in the dominant Russian culture.4 4 Russification was a particular
challenge to survival of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, due to the

similarities between the three languages.
The problem of what to do about the "nationalities problem" erupted
again following the success of the USSR against Germany in the eastern
front. With Stalin intent on securing his western border, a policy of ethnic
communism emerged under which it was assumed that "nationality could
create a Soviet interest in matching individuals to national territory" with

local elites ruling an ethnically pure nation but in the name of the larger
Soviet state. 45 Stalin, who had overseen earlier efforts to solve the
nationalities problem, took a cue from the early days of the Soviet Union
and directed that ways be found to isolate the "national interest" into a

social and cultural silo that would operate in parallel with a "political
identity" as a Soviet citizen. The goal was to create a single, unified identity
rather than two competing identities that ultimately had to diverge.
In the case of Ukraine and its status as the Ukrainian SSR, the
institutionalization of ethnic communism was facilitated by the purges and

counter-purges that transpired in Galicia and Volhynia following World
War II. Snyder exhaustively traces the history of this little-noted conflict
between Ukrainian and Polish partisans, including the role of Bandera and
the Ukrainian nationalists organized under the banner of the Ukrains'ka
Povstans'ka Armiia, or Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and their
participation in both the Holocaust and the atrocities committed against the

Poles.4 6 Snyder also gives equal time to the equivalent actions of Polish
forces against Ukrainian ethnics, including Operation Vistula, a 1947 effort
to rid Poland, once and for all, of its Ukrainian problem.4 7 The result of this
bloody history were two national states rather than the multi-nationalstates

that preceded them, that is, a shrunken, much more ethnically-defined
Poland bordered by a more ethnically pure Ukraine that included Galicia,
Volhynia, and the prized Lviv now nearly devoid of Jews and Poles, with
borders that eventually defined a sovereign Ukraine following the collapse
of the USSR.
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IV. THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN THE MULTI-VECTORAL POLICY

While the configurations of present day Poland, Ukraine, and other
states in the region must be contextualized both within the larger history of
the region's geographical destiny as a contested borderland and the
nationalist struggles of the early and mid-20th centuries, the contemporary
economic realities that define the region must not be overlooked. In the
field of international relations, economics is sometimes relegated to the
position of so-called low politics, a matter for consideration when power
politics are not the rule of the day. However, in the case of Ukraine, and
Yanukovych's decision to turn eastward, economics must be considered by
way of explanation.
The economic decision making of former Soviet states, particularly as it
pertains to the decision to turn either westward toward the EU or eastward
toward Russia, is based on the interaction of electoral contests, national
identity, and trade ties. Ukraine is not unique in this respect. However, the
economic and political realities of the past 20 years may explain the
differences between the westward turn of states such as the Baltics and
Yanukovych's turn toward Russia, given similar initial economic
conditions. The economies of the former Soviet States were dependent upon
Russia at the time of the Soviet breakup. Therefore, the decision by states
like the Baltics to "turn west" cannot be attributed to pre-existing economic
ties with the west and the lack of those ties with the east. According to
Rawi Abdelal, "they were all dependent upon Russia, especially for oil and
gas. They had few economic links with the West - in 1990, 90 percent of
Lithuania's total commerce was with other post-Soviet states, as was 87
percent of Belarus's and 82 percent of Ukraine's."4
Instead, Abdelal attributes the choice to "return to Europe" and embrace
economic liberalism as a result of domestic politics and national identity.4 9
Nationalists in the East European Communist states were uniformly in
favor of turning westward and adopting economic liberal policies, mostly
because they viewed Russia and their states' dependency upon Russia as
their largest security threat, but also because they considered the rightful
place of their state to be Europe. In the newly independent Baltic States, the
nationalists were elected into leadership positions, or co-opted the former
Communist party into a nationalist perspective, and the painful economic
transition began - cutting pre-existing trade ties, establishing new ones, and
engaging in shock therapy to effect the transformation to a liberal market
economy.
Ukraine remained largely unreformed, economically or politically,

48. RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: POST-SOVIET STATES
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (2001).
49.
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during the Kravchuk administration. In 1994, Kuchma's administration

chose what Abdelal refers to as a middle course, i.e. the multi-vectoral
policy."o

Ukraine received some assistance from the EU, particularly

through the TACIS Program, intended to foster democratic reforms and
western-style macroeconomic development in post-Soviet states. However,
the fact that later efforts at cooperation such as the PCA and ENP were
written without a "membership perspective" - a term used by the EU to

indicate that membership will be offered at some point in the future - meant
that the interactions between the EU and Ukraine were more limited than
those with accession states." The painful adjustment that accession states

made - cutting off dependency on Russia and redirecting economic ties to
EU states - was not sufficiently incentivized in the Ukrainian case, and as a
result Russia remained an important economic partner for Ukraine.
Russia and Ukraine continue to share important trade ties. According to

Grigor'ev, Agibalov, and Salikhov, Russia remained Ukraine's biggest
trade partner in 2009.52 While most of the products Ukraine imported were
energy related, Russia served as an important market for Ukrainian exports

of equipment, metals, chemicals, and food. The importance of Ukrainian
exports cannot be overstated - exports have been a key driver of economic
growth, particularly in the eastern portion of the country, since the

economic revival in the early 2000s. These trade ties are partly a
continuation of Soviet-era ties, and partly the result of Russian government

efforts to re-engage with its neighbors through more trade and regional
trade agreement proposals such as the Eurasian Union between Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus - an agreement to which Russia would like to add
Ukraine as a member.5 3

The level of economic interaction with Ukraine's large neighbors,
Russia and the EU, varies by region within Ukraine. The importance of
Russia as an importer of Ukrainian-made goods - particularly heavy
machinery, equipment, chemicals, and metals - is most apparent in the

heavily industrialized eastern part of Ukraine. Economic growth in Ukraine
since 2000 has been largely based on the manufacturing, chemical, and
metallurgy sectors, and the eastern part of the country seems not only aware

of this, but also somewhat resentful of the supposed redistribution of profits
from the industrial east to the agricultural west (an exaggerated but not

50.
RAwI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: POST-SOVIET STATES
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (2001).

51.
52.
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L. Grigor'ev, S. Agibalov M. Salikhov, Ukraine: A Split Transformation, 52 PROBLEMS
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53. Alexander Libman & Evgeny Vinokurov. Regional Integration and Economic
Convergence in the Post-Soviet Space: Experience of the Decade of Growth, 50 JOURNAL OF
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entirely inaccurate understanding of Kiev's policies). The potential for
growth in Ukrainian export markets depends upon capital investment, and
though this could come from the EU or Russia, some in the east appear to
assume that Russia will be the most likely candidate to provide that
funding.5 Finally, other major importers of Ukrainian manufactures are
Belarus and Kazakhstan. In terms of trade ties and economic incentives, an
eastward turn and integration into a Eurasian Economic Community that
includes its most important trade partners (Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus) is entirely rational, and the east may blame western political
leaders for Ukraine's continuing choice to turn away from the Eurasian
Community in favor of the EU.
Likewise, the western portion of the country has economic reasons to
favor integration with the west and specifically the EU. Western Ukraine is
primarily agricultural, has shown slow or no growth in the independence
period, and sees a great deal of potential in integration with the EU because
of the latter's regional development policies (a.k.a. "structural funds") and
Common Agricultural Policy, both of which can provide assistance to less
developed and agricultural regions within EU member states. The western
region of Ukraine has also been subject to population movements out of the
agricultural regions and into the capital of Kiev, due to high unemployment
and lack of job opportunities. Integration with the European Union would
provide those leaving the agricultural sector access to larger labor markets
in the EU member states.56
Seen in terms of rational economic decision-making, recent agreements
between Ukraine and its powerful neighbors make a great deal of sense,
despite the apparent contradictions of seeking deeper integration with both
Russia and the EU simultaneously. While Yanukovych sought during his
first year in the Presidency to reassure the EU that Ukraine was continuing
to embrace its "European choice," he simultaneously opened an active
dialogue with the Russian government; the result of this dialogue was the
Kharkiv Agreement (2010) which offered use of the Sevastopol naval base
to Russia in exchange for a 30 percent cut in the price of Russian oil
imports for 10 years. Russia increased pressure on Ukraine to join the
Eurasian Economic Community - a move that was viewed negatively by
many Ukrainians.5 7 While most of this behavior could appear in keeping
with the multi-vectoral policy typical of Ukrainian leaders, the decision to
discontinue talks at the Vilnius Summit in 2013, therefore rejecting the
Association Agreement that would have bound Ukraine more closely to the

54.
55.
56.
57.

L. Grigor'ev, S. Agibalov M. Salikhov, supra, note 53.
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EU, seemed to signal a turn eastward rather than a multi-vectoral approach.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement signed after Yanukoyvch's
departure and under the Poroshenko regime contains a number of elements
that would be favorable to the western portion of the country and

potentially unfavorable to the east. The Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA) is expected to lead to modernization and integration
with EU markets (specifically in the trade of goods and services). However,
it also represents a potential "curtain" that would demarcate Ukraine as part
of the EU trade area and cut off (or at least, divert) trade with Ukraine's
trade partners to the east (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus), and defers

opening of EU markets to industrial goods until a later date." The
Agreement also explicitly states the EU's willingness to consider a visa
regime for Ukrainian workers, given progress on "well-managed and
security mobility" efforts.

As is the case with the Eurasian Community,

Ukrainian public opinion polls indicate that the EU is also seen as putting
undue pressure on Ukraine to 'pick a side,' while Ukrainian public opinion
favors the multi-vectoral approach.5
V. WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
Critically, the actions and sentiments that were at the core of Ukrainian

nationalism in the latter half of the

1 9 th

century and the first half of the

2 0 th

century are largely a product of the actions and sentiments held by western

Ukrainians. The key question for Ukrainian policymakers, however, is the
extent to which the last century of nation-building has resulted in a
convergence of opinion between east and west6 0 and whether, at least with

regard to the "big questions" of economic development and democracy,
there exists something resembling a national consensus.
Ukrainian polling data collected in the Neighbourhood Barometer from

2012-2014 demonstrates a generally disillusioned Ukrainian population,
even when compared to the broader "neighborhood east" states of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova. In each of the questions
addressed below, Ukrainian respondents were more negative than the
neighborhood east average, indicating a very high level of dissatisfaction
even when compared to states that could be considered more troubled than

58. Information on the Association Agreement can be found via the European Union's
European
External
Action
Service
website
at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu-ukraine/association agreement/index en.htm
59. Armandon, supra note 5, at 289.
60. We recognize that other geographic divisions also exist, for instance, between the south,
often taken to include Crimea and central Ukraine a region from where the iconic national image
of the Cossack springs. However, given the central importance of the east/west divide we will
limit our discussion to these regions.
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Ukraine.6 1 When asked about life satisfaction, Ukrainians responded
negatively, with 57 percent indicating they were "not satisfied" in 2012; 58
and 63 percent indicated they were not satisfied in 2013 (autumn) and 2014
(spring), respectively.6 2 When asked whether Ukraine was headed in the
right or wrong direction, respondents likewise demonstrated a high level of
pessimism: in 2012, 48 percent indicated Ukraine was headed in the wrong
direction (only 11 percent felt it was headed in the right direction).63 In the
2013 spring survey, this attitude worsened, with 56 percent saying the
country was headed in the wrong direction.64 However, the response to this
question changed in the 2014 surveys - conducted during the Euromaidan
protests - with those responding "wrong direction" down to 35 percent, and
31 percent indicating the country was headed in the "right direction."65
Dissatisfaction had both political and economic dimensions, with
Ukrainian public opinion regarding how democracy works in Ukraine and
regarding the economic situation in Ukraine being quite negative from
2012-2014. With regards to democracy, in 2012 a full 75 percent indicated
they were not satisfied with how democracy works in Ukraine, and
subsequent surveys indicated that this continued to be a point of
dissatisfaction among Ukrainian respondents, with 68-69 percent not
satisfied.66 Respondents' assessments of the economic conditions in
Ukraine went from bad to worse in this time period. In 2012, 78 percent
indicated the current economic situation was bad (only 16 percent
responded that it was good); in subsequent surveys the "bad" response
increased steadily, from 87 percent in spring 2013 to 92 percent in spring
201467 An ad-hoc Neighbourhood Barometer regarding employment

61. European Union
Neighbourhood Barometer:
Ukraine, Autumn
2012,
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPIwave2-UA-EN.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014); European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Spring 2013,
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FS-ENPI-Wave-3-UA-EN.pdf
(last
visited October 1, 2014); European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2013,
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FS-ENPI-Wave-4-UA-EN.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014); European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Spring 2014,
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FS-ENPI-Wave-5-UA-EN.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014).
62. European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2012; European Union
NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2013; European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer:
Ukraine, Spring 2014.
63. European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2012.
64. European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Spring 2013.
65. European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Spring 2014.
66. European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2012; European Union
Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Spring 2013; European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer:
Ukraine, Autumn 2013; European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Spring 2014.
67. European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Autumn 2012; European Union
Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Spring 2013; European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer:
Ukraine, Autumn 2013; European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer: Ukraine, Spring 2014.
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conditions conducted in 2013 sheds some light on the reasons for this
negative evaluation of the Ukrainian economy - 53 percent had a negative
outlook about the future of employment, 72 percent feared losing their job
(fears that a partner or children would lose their jobs were also high for the
east neighborhood), and 60 percent considered employment assistance
services in their country not useful.68
While dissatisfaction runs deep throughout Ukraine, there are also
pronounced differences between east and west, a fact revealed in a March
2014 survey conducted by the Gallup organization in cooperation with the
International Republican Institute (2014).69 Using many of the same
questions posed by the Neighbourhood Barometer, the poll starkly
demonstrated the divisions that plague the country. Consider, for instance,
the actions of the Russian Federation and its commitment of resources,
including troops, off-duty or otherwise. While majorities in both regions
objected to such actions, some 98 percent of western residents expressed
objections compared to 61 percent in the east.7 0 Even starker divisions
emerge when considering even a referendum on Crimea's future. Some 94
percent in the west consider the possibility as a clear attempt to break up
Ukraine into pieces, and therefore a threat to its independence.7 1 In the east,
however, opinion is relatively evenly divided, with 45 percent of the
respondents seeing a referendum as the legitimate right of the residents of
Crimea to express their opinion about their future, a sentiment expressed by
a mere 2 percent in the west; only a slightly smaller 40 percent saw such a
vote as a threat to the country's integrity. Similarly sharp divisions

68. European Union NeighbourhoodBarometer East: Ad-Hoc Survey, Employment (2013),
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/RapportENPI ad-hoc2 EAST.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014) (While significant, these cleavages are ameliorated by at least one
increasingly significant factor, namely, age. As is the case in adjacent countries, there is now
coming of age a generation that never experienced the rough tutelage of a Soviet Republic. In both
Belarus and Lithuania, for instance, there is a clearly emerging sense of 'being' Lithuanian or
Belarusian and an accompanying sense of national loyalty. This is true despite the fact that
Russian is commonly spoken both in formal setting, i.e., work or at university, and at home);
Theiss - Morse, supra note 25, at 143.
69. International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, March
14-26,
2014,
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%2OApril%205%201RI%20Public%200pinion%2OSurv
ey%20of%2OUkraine,%2OMarch%2014-26,%202014.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2014); The survey
used the following geographic designations: Oblasts in the west: Chernivetska, Ivano-Frankivska,
Khmelnytska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopilska, Transcarpathian, Volynska; Oblasts in the center:
Cherkaska, Chernihivska, Kirovogradska, Kyivska, Poltavska, Sumska, Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska,
and the city of Kyiv; Oblasts in the south: autonomous region of Crimea, Khersonska,
Mykolaivska, Odeska, Sevastopol, Zaporizka; Oblasts in the East: Dnipropetrovska, Donetska,
Kharkivska, Luhanska.
70. International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, March
14-26, (2014).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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characterize general perceptions of Russia's actions in the Crimea. Some
three-quarters of respondents in both western and central Ukraine regard
such actions as an "invasion and occupation of independent Ukraine," a
view shared by 37 percent and 30 percent of the respondents in southern
and eastern Ukraine, respectively.7 3
The proper cultural orientation of the country also sparks regional
controversy. For instance, when asked about a choice of joining one
international economic union, an overwhelming 90 percent of western
respondents favored the European Union, a choice favored by only one-fifth
of eastern respondents.74 Instead, a healthy majority (59 percent) of eastern
respondents favored joining the customs union with Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan.75 Equally strong divisions were demonstrated with regard to
the signing of the EU Association Agreement, with 72 percent of western
respondents urging an immediate signing, a move favored by only 13
percent in the east.7 6 The desire for a move west is only somewhat tempered
by the more controversial proposition of NATO membership. Thus, while
67 percent in the west would vote for NATO membership, an almost equal
percentage (64 percent) of eastern residents would vote against being part
of NATO.77
While all of these questions point to the sort of geographic divisions
often noted in the popular and scholarly media, there is one issue around
which much less disagreement exists. As noted above, Russian President
Putin makes much of the threat to Russian speakers in many of the postSoviet countries, a threat so severe as to justify the sorts of aggressive
tactics currently on display in Ukraine. However, the supposed beneficiaries
of his rescue efforts do not seem to share his views. Thus, on the key
question of whether Russian speakers feel "under pressure or threat because
of their language," fully 85 percent of respondents throughout the country
do not perceive such a threat.78 Even more surprising, given Putin's dark
view of the matter, fully three-quarters of eastern residents agreed that no
such pressures exist. Reality, it seems, has yet to penetrate the Russian
president's world-view.7
CONCLUSION

Clearly, the Ukrainian political and economic systems have a long way
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75. Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine supra n. 71.
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78. International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, March
14-26, (2014),
79. Id.
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to go before they will regain the faith of the population. One way in which
this may be accomplished is in cooperation with one of Ukraine's powerful
neighbors, who not only have deep pockets, but may also be able to provide
guidance and incentives on such tasks as modernization, democratization,

and market transition. The difficulty in this approach lies in Ukrainian
public sentiment regarding the choice of either the European Union or a
Eurasian Community. As noted above, while surveys clearly demonstrate a

broad level of public support for the multi-vectoral policy overall, there are
distinct regional divides with regards to preference for integration with the
EU versus a Eurasian Community.o Further, while integration with the EU
would bring with it assistance on a variety of tasks, including
democratization, rule of law, reducing corruption, and modernizing the
economy, Ukrainian trust of the Union has always been middling at best,

hovering around 50 percent, though levels of trust in the EU always exceed
those for the UN or NATO." The other likely choice for Ukraine is the
Eurasian Community. While national-level data does not provide a great
deal of support for a hard turn east toward Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan,

the desire to accommodate regional sentiments and the reality of regional
economic differences provide justification for at least an accommodation
with the Eurasian Community.8 2
The hard choices facing Ukraine should come as no surprise in a
country that has historically served as a borderland between empires and
world-views. Whether to turn east or west remains a decision mediated by

80. Armandon, supra note 5, at 289.
81. Trust does not necessarily equate with a positive image for the EU, as only 41 to 49
percent of respondents in the Eurobarometer survey indicate they view the EU positively. This
may be related to high expectations of the EU's potential to assist Ukraine; in 2012 respondents
demonstrated high hopes for the EU's ability to assist in economic development (76 percent),
trade (69 percent), human rights (64 percent), and democracy (60 percent). When these high hopes
are compared to the respondents' perception of what the EU has actually done for Ukraine, a gap
becomes apparent. From 2012-2013, respondents were underwhelmed by the EU's level of
engagement with Ukraine, with 37 to 44 percent indicating the EU had an appropriate level of
involvement in Ukraine. This number increased in 2014, again in conjunction with the
Euromaidan protests and in the context of negotiations of the Association Agreement, to 57
percent. The responses to the question regarding the EU's contribution to economic development
in Ukraine followed a very similar pattern in each of the surveys, with reality of EU assistance
falling far short of its perceived potential, though with a slight uptick in 2014. It is not surprising
that Ukrainians would feel as if the potential of the relationship with the EU has not been met,
given the discussion above regarding the EU's reluctance to provide a membership perspective or
timeline for Ukraine's entry into the EU.
82. In the national-level Neighbourhood Barometer conducted in 2012, respondents were
asked which actors would be most effective in assisting in Ukraine's economic development. The
largest share of respondents placed this responsibility on the Ukrainian government itself (44
percent), followed by the EU (40 percent), and a "Single Economic Area with other CIS" (14
percent);
European Union Neighbourhood Barometer: Ukraine, Autumn
2012,
http://euneighbourhood.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPIwave2-UA-EN.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014).
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struggles over identity as well as the practical politics of a region that
continues to be unsettled by both centuries-long historical trends and

actions taken by those whose sense of self, both personal and national, is
deeply informed by competing visions of the past. Whether the nationbuilding efforts of the last hundred years or so will serve as a sufficient
bulwark against the disintegration of contemporary Ukraine, is no doubt the

most pressing challenge faced by both the country's leaders and those who
choose to call themselves Ukrainian.

